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SEEKING LIBERTY’S REFUGE:  ANALYZING 
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE UNDER CASEY’S UNDUE 
BURDEN STANDARD 
Lucy E. Hill* 
 
 In the 1992 decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted the “undue burden” standard for 
evaluating the constitutionality of abortion laws.  Under that standard, a 
state is free to regulate abortion, as long as the regulation does not have 
the purpose or effect of imposing an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
an abortion.  Although the standard is disjunctive, the Casey opinion 
focuses on the “effect” prong of the test, with little guidance as to what a 
“purpose” prong inquiry would look like.  Subsequent Supreme Court 
abortion jurisprudence has served only to obscure the issue.  Circuit courts, 
therefore, have taken differing approaches to claims that an abortion law 
was adopted for an invalid purpose. 
This Note addresses the divide in how courts evaluate purpose-based 
challenges under Casey’s undue burden standard.  One group of courts—
including the Tenth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits—apply heightened scrutiny 
to purpose prong challenges, requiring that the state articulate an 
important governmental interest, which is substantially related to the 
regulation in question.  In contrast, a second group of courts–comprised of 
the Seventh and Fourth Circuits–apply rational basis review to purpose-
based claims, requiring only that the law be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.  This Note argues that the application of 
heightened scrutiny to purpose-based challenges more accurately applies 
prior Supreme Court abortion precedent, and is more consonant with 
substantive due process jurisprudence as a whole.  It concludes with a 
discussion of the effect that heightened scrutiny would have on many 
common abortion laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”1 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 the U.S. 
Supreme Court crafted the “undue burden” standard for evaluating the 
 
 1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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constitutionality of laws that affect a woman’s right to seek an abortion.3  
Under this standard, states are free to regulate abortion so long as they do 
not enact regulations that have the “purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”4  The undue burden standard governs a variety of abortion 
laws, including those that regulate the medical procedure of abortion itself, 
those that dictate the steps that must be taken by abortion providers and 
women seeking abortions, and those that affect the financing of abortions.5  
Some common abortion laws include mandatory waiting periods between 
the initial doctor’s visit and the abortion procedure, parental consent or 
notification laws for minors, and mandatory counseling prior to obtaining 
an abortion.6  Others include safety laws that govern specific details of 
abortion facilities, such as the size of operating rooms or the width of 
hallways, as well as prohibitions on abortion coverage in health insurance 
policies.7  Since Casey, the number of major abortion laws enacted in the 
United States at the state level has hovered around twenty per year.8  
During 2011, however, the number of new abortion laws enacted by states 
spiked to an all-time high of 135.9  These new laws range from variations 
on the commonplace abortion restrictions listed above, to more novel 
measures that push against the boundaries of constitutionality.10   
 
 3. Id. at 872–74. 
 4. Id. at 877. 
 5. See Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Where Abortion Rights Are Disappearing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2011, at SR14; see also States Enact Record Number of Abortion 
Restrictions in 2011, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/
inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html [hereinafter GUTTMACHER INST.]. 
 6. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 
1066 (D.S.D. 2011) (authorizing a preliminary injunction against a 2011 South Dakota law 
requiring a mandatory seventy-two hour waiting period between the initial physician’s visit 
and the abortion procedure); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 3 (describing new laws in 
Texas, North Carolina, and South Dakota requiring counseling prior to obtaining an 
abortion). 
 7. See, e.g., ACLU of Kan. and W. Mo. v. Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1217 (D. 
Kan. 2011) (upholding a Kansas law restricting insurance coverage for abortion); 
Marc Santora, Mississippi Law Aimed at Abortion Clinic Is Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
2012, at A9 (describing a Mississippi law, which would have required all abortion providers 
to be licensed “OB-GYNs with privileges to admit patients to a local hospital”); Taunya 
English, Defending and Disputing Plan for Changing Pennsylvania Abortion Regulations, 
NEWSWORKS (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/component/
flexicontent/item/29971–defending–and–disputing–plan–for–changing–pa–abortion–
regulations (describing proposed legislation in Pennsylvania that would require all abortion 
clinics to meet the standards for ambulatory surgical facilities, which must have larger 
operating rooms, wider hallways, and hospital-grade elevators, among other things). 
 8. See Samuels, supra note 3; GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 3. 
 9. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 3. 
 10. See, e.g., Nick Baumann, Congressional GOP Pushes Zygote Personhood Bills, 
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 8, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/
mississippi–personhood–zygote–federal–law (describing “personhood” bills, which have 
been proposed by various states and by Congress, and define life as beginning at 
conception); Jessie L. Bonner, Doc-Lawyer Will Intervene in Idaho Fetal Pain Case, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-
06/D9V8A1S00.htm (detailing a lawsuit challenging Idaho’s “fetal pain” statute, which 
prohibits abortions after nineteen weeks under the premise that fetuses can feel pain after this 
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Recently, several policy debates at the federal level have also revolved 
around the issue of abortion.  Although the government has prohibited the 
use of federal money for abortions since the 1970s,11 health care reform has 
drawn abortion funding into the spotlight.12  On the day after President 
Obama signed the Affordable Care Act,13 he issued an executive order 
indicating that no government funding would be provided under the bill to 
finance abortions, and reaffirming the preexisting federal regulations.14 
In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Protect Life Act,15 
which would prohibit federal funding for health care plans that provide 
abortion services, as well as prevent the withholding of federal funds from 
health care providers who refuse to perform abortions.16  Opponents of the 
bill argue that this would discourage insurance companies from covering 
abortions, and would protect hospitals from liability for failing to provide 
life-saving abortions.17  The bill provoked strong reactions, and was dubbed 
the “Let Women Die” Act by pro-choice groups following House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi’s statement that under the bill “women can die on the 
floor and health care providers do not have to intervene.”18  Supporters of 
the bill say that unwilling taxpayers should not have to subsidize abortion in 
any way.19  The Senate has not yet considered the bill.20 
These new state and federal abortion laws have provoked impassioned 
responses both from those who firmly believe that abortion takes an 
innocent child’s life, as well as from those who argue that such measures 
wrongfully turn back the clock on women’s rights.21  Anti-abortion activists 
 
point); Jo Ingles, Anti–abortion Forces Rally for “Heartbeat Bill” in Ohio, REUTERS (Sept. 
20, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/20/us-ohio-heartbeat-bill-
idUSTRE78J2F020110920 (describing Ohio’s proposed “heartbeat” bill, which would ban 
abortions after the first detectable heartbeat of the fetus, which occurs roughly six weeks 
after conception). 
 11. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 12. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Obama:  Abortion Funding Not Main Focus of Health 
Reform, CBSNEWS (July 21, 2009 11:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-
5178972-503544.html. 
 13. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), provides for widespread health insurance reforms. See generally id. 
 14. Exec. Order No. 13,535, Ensuring Enforcement and Implementation of Abortion 
Restrictions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 
29, 2010). 
 15. H.R. Res. 358, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Laura Bassett, Protect Life Act:  New Bill Would Allow Hospitals to Refuse to 
Perform Abortions, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/10/11/protect–life–act–anti–abortion–bill_n_1005937.html?. 
 18. See Deidre Walsh, House Passes Bill on Abortion Funding, CNN (Oct. 13, 2011) 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-13/politics/politics_health-bill-abortion_1_abortion-services-
health-care-pitts-bill?_s=PM:POLITICS; see also Erin Gloria Ryan, House Passes ‘Let 
Women Die’ Bill After Extremely Depressing Debate, JEZEBEL (Oct. 14, 2011, 11:40 AM), 
http://jezebel.com/5849839/house-passes-let-women-die-bill-after-extremely-depressing-
debate. 
 19. See Walsh, supra note 18. 
 20. See Protect Life Act, H.R.358, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 21. Compare Anu Kumar, Do U.S. Abortion Restrictions Violate Human Rights?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anu–kumar/
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have supported the majority of these new laws as part of their strategy to 
narrow abortion rights incrementally, law by law.22  As these abortion laws 
increasingly restrict a woman’s right to obtain an abortion, pro-choice 
advocates have begun to challenge them on the basis of their purpose, 
forcing courts to consider whether these new laws truly seek to further 
legitimate state interests, or if their passage was motivated by an 
illegitimate interest in preventing abortions.23 
Although this year marks the twentieth anniversary of Casey, there is still 
uncertainty over what constitutes a permissible abortion law under its undue 
burden test.24  The undue burden test as defined by Casey is considered 
disjunctive, prohibiting abortion laws that have the “purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of 
a nonviable fetus.”25  But the vast majority of cases have focused on 
whether an abortion law has an unconstitutional effect on a woman’s right 
to obtain an abortion.26 
Conversely, few cases have dealt with the purpose prong, and what 
jurisprudence exists is far from clear.27  The lower courts have struggled 
with (1) what constitutes a permissible legislative purpose; (2) how 
compelling that purpose must be to justify limiting the right to seek an 
abortion; and (3) the appropriate level of deference to the state’s proffered 
purposes.28  The Supreme Court perpetuated this confusion by suggesting, 
in dicta, that an unconstitutional purpose alone may not be enough to 
invalidate an abortion law.29  As a result, courts responding to purpose-
based challenges to the new abortion laws face a complicated mess of 
precedents, which will only compound the thorny political and moral 
questions accompanying such litigation. 
This Note seeks to resolve the conflict among courts over how to apply 
Casey’s purpose prong, by proposing a solution that is consistent not only 
with the limits set by Casey, but also with purpose inquiries in other 
 
abortion–human–rights_b_1029221.html, and Ryan, supra note 18, with Ryan Bomberger, 
Abortion:  Planned Parenthood Wants Your Baby Dead, LIFENEWS.COM (Oct. 27, 2011, 
10:16 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/10/27/abortion-planned-parenthood-wants-your-
baby-dead/, and Ken Connor, Op-Ed., Abortion:  An Inconvenient Truth, CHRISTIAN POST 
(Nov. 1, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/abortion–an–inconvenient–
truth–60025/. 
 22. See Erik Eckholm, Anti-abortion Groups Are Split on Legal Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2011, at A1 (describing how some anti-abortion advocates are beginning to abandon 
the incremental strategy in favor of an “all-out legal assault on Roe v. Wade”); Samuels, 
supra note 3. 
 23. See, e.g., ACLU of Kan. and W. Mo. v. Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1212 (D. 
Kan. 2011) (regarding a purpose-based challenge to a new Kansas law dealing with 
insurance coverage for abortion); Santora, supra note 5 (describing a judge’s decision to 
enjoin a Mississippi law because he found that the purpose of the law was to eliminate 
Mississippi’s only abortion clinic); see also infra Part I.C.3. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 26. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); infra Part I.C.4. 
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constitutional contexts.  Part I of this Note describes how courts have 
conducted evaluations of legislative purpose in other areas of constitutional 
law.  It also provides an overview of abortion jurisprudence, from the 
identification of a fundamental right to abortion access in Roe, to the liberty 
interest described in Casey.  Part II explains how the various circuits have 
developed different methods of investigating legislative purpose for 
abortion laws.  Finally, Part III argues that the purpose prong is still a viable 
part of the Casey undue burden test, and that the Supreme Court should 
adopt a heightened standard of review, using the Fifth Circuit’s approach, in 
order to ensure that legislatures respect the Court’s current jurisprudence.   
I.  THE ROAD TO A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:  SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE, AND 
THE RIGHT TO ABORTION 
Before delving into abortion jurisprudence, it is necessary to provide a 
basic framework for constitutional analysis.  Part I.A discusses the manner 
in which constitutional rights are identified under substantive due process, 
as well as the way the Supreme Court typically deals with challenges to 
legislation based on violations of those rights.  Part I.B then examines the 
various methods employed by the Supreme Court to discern legislative 
purpose outside of the abortion context.  Finally, Part I.C examines the 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. 
A.  The Fundamental Rights Framework and the 
Introduction of “Liberty Interests” 
The Supreme Court has found certain rights inherent in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.30  The Fifth Amendment 
restricts the power of the federal government, by providing that “[n]o 
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”31  The Fourteenth Amendment applies the Fifth Amendment to the 
states, asserting that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”32  While liberty includes certain 
procedural due process guarantees (i.e., certain procedures the government 
must follow before depriving a citizen of her liberty, such as providing 
notice and a hearing), the Court has also held that the concept of liberty 
encompasses a variety of other substantive freedoms.33  Such rights include 
many personal and familial rights, including the right to marry,34 to keep 
one’s family together,35 to control the education of one’s children,36 to have 
 
 30. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 792–93 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 33. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 545–46. 
 34. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 35. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431, 503 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 36. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
2012] SEEKING LIBERTY’S REFUGE 371 
privacy in an intimate relationship,37 and most saliently to this Note, to be 
autonomous in making reproductive choices.38 
Not every law that restricts one of these due process liberties is 
unconstitutional, however.  Rather, courts typically apply a four-factor test 
to due process based challenges.39 
First, courts ask:  Does a fundamental right exist?40  Determining what is 
or is not a fundamental right is a complicated process,41 and one that often 
divides the Justices of the Supreme Court.42  But in cases involving a right 
already identified by the Court, such as the rights above, the answer to this 
question is predetermined.  Since the right of a woman to seek an abortion 
has been established since Roe v. Wade43 in 1973,44 this Note need not 
address this factor. 
If a fundamental right does not exist, courts apply rational basis review to 
the law.45  Rational basis review is itself a two-part test.46  First, courts 
must determine whether there was a legitimate legislative interest behind 
the law.47  Second, courts must determine whether the law is rationally 
related to that interest.48  Rational basis is an extremely deferential form of 
review, wherein the burden of proof is on the challenger to show the law’s 
invalidity.49  Laws rarely fail rational basis review.50 
But if a fundamental right does exist, courts proceed to the second step of 
the fundamental rights evaluation:  Was the right infringed?51  This is an 
important step, because not every law that burdens a right is considered an 
infringement.52  Courts consider whether the interference has a direct or 
substantial effect on the right.53  Although courts typically do not pay much 
attention to this question in the context of other fundamental rights, it has 
become a central question when discussing abortion laws.54 
 
 37. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 38. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453 (1972). 
 39. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 794–98. 
 40. See id. at 794; Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed:  The Role of Undue 
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 867 (1994). 
 41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 795–96. 
 42. For two competing approaches, compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 567–79 
(employing a natural rights analysis, and arguing that rights must be articulated at a general 
level so that concepts of liberty can evolve over time), with Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 122–124 (1989) (arguing that there must be a history or tradition of respecting a 
specific right in order for the right to be constitutionally protected). 
 43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 44. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 45. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 794. 
 46. See id. at 540. 
 47. Id. at 540, 797. 
 48. Id. at 540. 
 49. Id. at 678. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 796–97; Brownstein, supra note 40, at 867. 
 52. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 796. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 796–97; Brownstein, supra note 40, at 870. 
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Once courts have answered these two questions in the affirmative, they 
apply strict scrutiny to the law, which requires a compelling state interest 
that is narrowly tailored to meet that end.55  Thus, the third step requires 
answering the question:  Is there a compelling state interest for the 
government’s infringement of the right?56  As with determining what 
constitutes a fundamental right, there are no clear criteria for defining a 
“compelling” state interest.57  The government bears the burden of proof 
under strict scrutiny, and it is very difficult for it to articulate a compelling 
justification.58  Only concerns of great significance—like national 
security—have been recognized as compelling state interests.59 
Finally, courts must then ask:  Are the means adequately related to the 
interest?60  Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
the government’s interest.61  It must be the least restrictive alternative to 
achieve that interest; it cannot merely be a legitimate way to realize that 
goal, as under rational basis review.62  Again, there is no formal framework 
for determining exactly what constitutes narrow tailoring, or what is 
considered a less-restrictive alternative.63 
Although this is the traditional framework for evaluating fundamental 
rights, the Court in Casey, and later in Lawrence v. Texas,64 redefined some 
constitutional interests as “liberty interests” rather than fundamental 
rights.65  Casey dealt with a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.66  The 
approach taken by Casey will be discussed in detail in Part I.C.3.  
Lawrence, decided more than a decade after Casey, dealt with the right to 
engage in private, consensual sexual conduct.67  In Lawrence, the police 
responded to a call regarding a reported weapons disturbance, but found 
two men having sex.68  They arrested the men under a Texas sodomy law, 
which prohibited same-sex sexual activity as “deviate sexual intercourse.”69  
The men then challenged the validity of the Texas law under the Due 
Process Clause.70  Although in Bowers v. Hardwick,71 a similar case 
 
 55. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 794–98. 
 56. Id. at 797; Brownstein, supra note 40, at 867. 
 57. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 797. 
 58. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 542. 
 59. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–18 (1944) (identifying 
national security as a compelling state interest). 
 60. See id. at 797; Brownstein, supra note 40, at 868. 
 61. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 797–98. 
 62. Id. at 797. 
 63. Id. at 797–98. 
 64. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 65. See id. at 567 (discussing “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution” instead of 
fundamental rights); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) 
(referring to “the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty” rather than her fundamental 
right). 
 66. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
 67. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 68. Id. at 562–63. 
 69. Id. at 563. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559 (2003). 
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decided in 1986, the Court had held that there was no “fundamental right 
. . . [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy,”72 the Lawrence Court 
overruled that holding.73  The Lawrence Court reasoned that the liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows all people to have privacy in making 
choices about sexual conduct, which is just one element of the inherently 
related freedom to enter into intimate relationships.74 
Although the Lawrence Court relied upon older cases that identified 
fundamental rights,75 nowhere in its opinion did the Court categorize the 
freedom to enter into intimate relationships as a fundamental right, nor did 
it articulate a level of scrutiny.76  Nonetheless, the Court flatly rejected the 
state’s interest in promoting the moral condemnation of homosexuality.  
The Court stated, “[t]he issue is whether the majority may use the power of 
the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of 
the criminal law.  ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.’”77  The rejection of this state interest 
suggests the Court applied some form of heightened scrutiny to this law, as 
a moral justification for a law is sufficient to pass rational basis review.78 
In other areas of constitutional law, there is a level of review between 
strict scrutiny and rational basis known as intermediate scrutiny.79  
Intermediate scrutiny requires that a law be substantially related to an 
important government interest.80  It is not clear, however, if the Court 
applied this level of scrutiny in Lawrence.81 
B.  Evaluation of Legislative Purpose in Other Constitutional Contexts 
Although this Note focuses on the analysis of legislative purpose in the 
abortion context, courts often rely by analogy on other cases that examine 
other types of legislative purpose.  Evaluating the “institutional intentions 
of a deliberative body” is difficult for courts, and raises uncomfortable 
issues of comity between the judiciary and the legislature.82  This section 
 
 72. Id. at 190. 
 73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
 74. See id. at 567. 
 75. See id. at 564–66 (discussing the line of cases which identify the fundamental right 
to privacy, including Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe). 
 76. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 846. See generally Lawrence, 539 US 559. 
 77. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992)). 
 78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 846.  In his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia 
listed a variety of commonplace laws which are supported by a morality interest, such as 
laws banning bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, adultery, prostitution, masturbation, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589–90 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the 
ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is 
‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”). 
 79. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 540. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 846 (“[T]he Court in Lawrence did not 
articulate the level of scrutiny to be used.”). 
 82. See Brownstein, supra note 40, at 941–42. 
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details several non-abortion cases examining legislative purpose, which 
courts have cited when evaluating abortion cases. 
1.  Analysis of Legislative Purpose Under the Establishment Clause 
Edwards v. Aguillard83 addressed a challenge to a state statute under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.84  This clause provides, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”85  
The case dealt with a challenge to the Louisiana Creationism Act,86 which 
forbade public schools from teaching evolution unless creationism was also 
taught.87  The law was challenged as furthering an impermissible religious 
viewpoint favoring the Biblical story of creation; the state countered by 
arguing that the Creationism Act served the legitimate purpose of protecting 
academic freedom.88  The Court applied the three-pronged test it had 
developed for evaluating whether legislation comports with the 
Establishment Clause:  “First, the legislature must have adopted the law 
with a secular purpose.  Second, the statute’s principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.  Third, the statute 
must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with 
religion.”89  Since the Court found Louisiana to have acted with an 
impermissible religious purpose, the Court did not analyze the other two 
steps.90 
The Court provided several factors to consider when evaluating 
legislative purpose: 
A court’s finding of improper purpose behind a statute is appropriately 
determined by the statute on its face, its legislative history, or its 
interpretation by a responsible administrative agency.  The plain meaning 
of the statute’s words, enlightened by their context and the 
contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of 
legislative purpose.  Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a 
statute, the Court has also considered the historical context of the statute, 
and the specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute.91 
The Court also explained that “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential 
to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement 
of such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”92  Here, the Court found that 
the statute did not further the purported goal of promoting academic 
freedom.93  Whereas Louisiana teachers formerly had the liberty to teach 
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 84. Id. at 580–81. 
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any scientific theory of life, they were now constrained to a particular 
curriculum.94  Because the law did not further the purported purpose of 
promoting academic freedom, the Court reasoned that this was not the true 
purpose of the law.95 
2.  Purpose Analysis for Facially Neutral Laws with a Disparate Impact 
 In Washington v. Davis,96 the Supreme Court set forth the test for facially 
neutral laws with a discriminatory impact on a constitutionally protected 
group.97  Washington dealt with a constitutional challenge to a literacy test 
used for qualification for the Washington, D.C., police force.98   Although 
the test was facially neutral, as it did not explicitly distinguish between 
groups,99 black applicants tended to score disproportionately lower on the 
exam, and the plaintiffs therefore asserted that the test was being used to 
exclude black applicants from the police force.100  The Court held that a 
facially neutral policy with a disparate impact on a particular protected 
group could be struck down only if the group could show it was motivated 
by an unconstitutional purpose to discriminate.101  Once evidence of an 
unconstitutional purpose was shown, the burden shifted to the state to rebut 
this presumption.102  The Court acknowledged that, in certain situations, the 
discriminatory impact would be so great that it would be difficult for the 
legislature to demonstrate any non-discriminatory purpose.103  If the group 
could not show an unconstitutional purpose for the facially neutral law, 
however, the law would simply have to meet rational basis review.104  
Because the applicants had presented no evidence that the test was adopted 
for the purpose of discriminating, the law had only to pass rational basis 
review.105  The Court upheld the test, finding that it furthered the legitimate 
interest in having a police force with certain communicative capabilities.106 
3.  Analysis of Legislative Purpose in Gerrymandering Cases 
In Miller v. Johnson107 and Shaw v. Hunt,108 two voting rights cases 
decided around the same time, the Court struck down two legislative 
redistricting plans in Georgia and North Carolina, which were 
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gerrymandered in order to create several districts with a majority of black 
voters.109  As stated earlier in Washington, a facially neutral law with a 
discriminatory impact is only void if it was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose.110  Miller lays out a test for determining when a discriminatory 
purpose can be presumed in the gerrymandering context: 
The plaintiff’s burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence 
of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to 
legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the 
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or 
without a particular district.  To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove 
that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations.  Where these or other race-neutral 
considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not 
subordinated to race, a State can “defeat a claim that a district has been 
gerrymandered on racial lines.”  These principles inform the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof at trial.111 
This test was again applied in Shaw.112 
Often in the case of gerrymandering, such a purpose is plain because of 
the unusual shape of the electoral districts, which cannot be explained 
except by racial motivations.113  In both cases, the shape of the legislative 
district was exceedingly unusual.114  And in both cases, the Court had 
additional evidence of actual legislative intent:  that the legislature was 
concerned with maximizing the power of the black vote under an 
affirmative action mandate from the Justice Department under the Voting 
Rights Act.115  In both cases, because the legislature was found to have 
acted with the predominant purpose of discriminating on racial lines, the 
plans were subjected to strict scrutiny, and ultimately struck down.116 
 
 109. See id. at 901–02; Miller, 515 U.S. at 927–28. 
 110. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 111. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
 112. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 905–06. 
 113. See, e.g., id.; Miller, 515 U.S. at 917. 
 114. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 905–06 (“[T]he serpentine district has been dubbed the least 
geographically compact district in the Nation.”); Miller, 515 U.S. at 917 (describing the 
district’s shape as containing various narrow land bridges to connect the city’s black 
populations). 
 115. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 911–13; Miller, 515 U.S. at 905–07. 
 116. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 918; Miller, 515 U.S. at 927–28.  Although remedying past 
racial discrimination can be a compelling state interest, in Miller, the state only created the 
district to comply with Justice Department mandates under the Voting Rights Act. See 
Miller, 515 U.S. at 920–22.  The Court rejected the Justice Department’s interpretation of the 
Act. See id. at 923.  In Shaw, the Court held that even if there were a compelling state 
interest in complying with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the proposed district was not 
narrowly tailored to meet that end. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 915. 
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C.  Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence 
This section describes the course of Supreme Court abortion 
jurisprudence, beginning with the identification of a fundamental right to 
abortion in Roe and the early abortion funding cases.  Next, it discusses the 
articulation of the undue burden test for evaluating abortion laws in Casey.  
Finally, this section addresses two post-Casey abortion cases which touch 
upon issues of legislative purpose and the appropriate standard of review:  
Mazurek v. Armstrong117 and Gonzales v. Carhart.118 
1.  Roe v. Wade 
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe, women have had 
the constitutional right to seek an abortion.119  The Court struck down a 
Texas law criminalizing abortion, and determined that a woman’s decision 
to terminate her pregnancy was part of the privacy right implicit in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of personal liberty.120  Because the 
Court identified the choice to seek an abortion as a fundamental right, any 
abortion law had to meet strict scrutiny.121  The Roe Court identified two 
compelling state interests in the abortion context:  first, in preserving and 
protecting the health of the woman; and second, in protecting a potential 
human life.122 
The Court determined that each of these state interests became 
“compelling” at a different point in the pregnancy, and established a 
trimester framework for analyzing abortion restrictions.123  During the first 
trimester of pregnancy, a woman has an absolute right to choose an 
abortion.124  Once a woman enters her second trimester, however, the 
government interest in protecting the health of the woman becomes 
compelling, because at this stage in the pregnancy, an abortion procedure 
becomes more perilous to the woman’s life than childbirth.125  The state, 
therefore, can regulate abortion procedures to further its interest in 
protecting women’s health and lives.126  Finally, in the third trimester, the 
state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling.127  This is 
such because at this late stage in the pregnancy, the fetus is “viab[le]”—
meaning that it is “capab[le] of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb.”128  Therefore, the state may prohibit women from obtaining an 
abortion in the third trimester of their pregnancy in order to further the 
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state’s interest in potential life, so long as the state provides an exception 
for the life or health of the woman.129 
2.  The Abortion Funding Cases 
Shortly after the politically controversial decision in Roe, a line of cases 
known as the “abortion funding” cases were decided.  Some states reacted 
to Roe by implementing measures limiting the availability of abortions 
under government funded healthcare programs like Medicaid.130  Beal v. 
Doe,131 and its better-known companion case, Maher v. Roe,132 challenged 
the constitutionality of state laws that limited abortion funding.133  Beal 
held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act134 (Title XIX), the law 
establishing the Medicaid program, did not require Pennsylvania to fund 
non-therapeutic abortions as a condition of participation in the federal 
Medicaid program; rather, states were allowed broad discretion to 
determine what medical assistance was “reasonable” and “consistent with 
the objectives” of Title XIX.135  The Court also recognized the right of the 
state to “encourage[] normal childbirth” in light of the state’s interest in 
preserving fetal life.136  Nevertheless, this decision did not prevent states 
from funding abortions under their Medicaid program if they so chose.137 
Maher involved a challenge to a virtually identical Connecticut law, this 
time under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.138  
The Court found that a law prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions, but 
providing funding for childbirth, did not implicate a fundamental right, and 
therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.139  The Maher Court 
stated, “[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a 
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity 
consonant with legislative policy.”140  Since the state had no obligation to 
provide medical assistance at all, it was not placing an additional obstacle in 
an indigent woman’s path to an abortion by refusing to fund this 
procedure.141  Although the state’s choice to fund childbirth may make this 
a more attractive option, the Court reasoned that an indigent woman’s 
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inability to obtain an abortion was a product of her own poverty, not the 
state’s regulation.142 
Justice Thurgood Marshall penned a blistering dissent to both 
decisions.143  Besides addressing the social impact of forcing already-
impoverished women to bear the additional costs of raising a child, Justice 
Marshall argued that these laws circumvented Roe by advancing an 
unconstitutional purpose to impose the moral viewpoint that abortion is 
wrong.144  He also identified the likely effect of such laws—that poor 
women would be prevented from obtaining safe and legal abortions.145 
While those cases were making their way to the Supreme Court, 
Representative Henry Hyde introduced a rider—known today as the Hyde 
Amendment146—to the 1977 federal appropriation law.147  The Hyde 
Amendment prohibits the use of federal funding for abortions, and restricts 
abortion coverage for Medicaid recipients, federal employees, Native 
Americans, and women in the military, among others.148  Originally, the 
Hyde Amendment provided no exceptions; however, it was amended in 
1978 to include an exception for pregnancies that threatened the life of the 
mother.149  Hyde stated his reason for proposing the bill:  “I would certainly 
like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich 
woman, a middle-class woman, or a poor woman.  Unfortunately, the only 
vehicle available is the [Medicaid] bill.”150  The Hyde Amendment 
therefore legislatively overruled the policy established in Beal, by which 
states could exercise their discretion over whether or not to fund abortions 
under Medicaid. 
Implementation of the Hyde Amendment was enjoined for several years 
while its constitutionality was litigated.151  Unsurprisingly, in Harris v. 
McRae,152 the Supreme Court followed the line of precedents it established 
in Beal and Maher, and found that the Hyde Amendment violated no 
statutory or constitutional prohibitions.153  Specifically, the Court held that 
Title XIX did not require states to fund medically necessary abortions for 
which federal funding was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment (i.e., 
abortions in the event of pregnancies which threatened the woman’s health, 
but not her life).154  The Court reasoned, “Title XIX was designed as a 
cooperative program of shared financial responsibility, not as a device for 
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the Federal Government to compel a State to provide services that Congress 
itself is unwilling to fund.”155 
The Court also found that the Hyde Amendment did not impinge on the 
fundamental right guaranteed in Roe.156  The Court applied the same 
reasoning to the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment challenges as it did to the 
claim in Maher, reasoning that a state may make “a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement[] that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds.”157  Although a woman has a constitutional right 
to obtain an abortion to protect her health, her “freedom of choice [does 
not] carr[y] with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to 
avail herself of the full range of protected choices.”158  As in Maher, the 
Court concluded that “[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent 
woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected 
freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on 
access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.”159 
Because the Hyde Amendment did not impinge on a fundamental right, 
the Court found that it only needed to meet rational basis review.160  By 
incentivizing childbirth through the Medicaid program, the Hyde 
Amendment was rationally related to the legitimate government interest in 
protecting fetal life.161  Therefore, the Court held that the Hyde Amendment 
was constitutionally permissible under the Fifth Amendment.162  Since 
then, the Hyde Amendment has been reenacted every year.163  Under the 
current version of the Hyde Amendment, states may obtain federal funding 
not only for abortions that are necessary to save the life of the woman, but 
also for abortions where the pregnancy resulted from rape.164 
The abortion funding cases conveyed a clear message:  although women 
have the right to obtain an abortion under Roe, they have no right to 
government funding or assistance in pursuing that right, even where the 
government provides money generally for medical treatment. 
3.  The Shift to the “Undue Burden” Standard:  Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,165 a plurality of the Court 
upheld three Missouri abortion restrictions under what appeared to be a 
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rational basis review.166  The plurality called into question the Roe trimester 
framework for evaluating abortion restrictions, calling it “unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice.”167  The plurality also indicated that 
the state has a compelling interest to protect potential human life throughout 
a woman’s pregnancy, not just after viability.168  In response to this 
decision, many states began enacting more restrictive abortion regulations, 
as the Court seemed poised to overrule Roe.169 
Pennsylvania was one such state, enacting the requirements that would be 
at issue in Casey: informed consent, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, 
spousal notification, parental notification, and reporting requirements for 
abortion facilities.170  Although the Casey Court affirmed the core holding 
of Roe—that women have the constitutional right to seek an abortion prior 
to viability—they rejected Roe’s trimester framework for evaluating 
abortion laws, and changed the test to the “undue burden” standard.171 
A woman’s right to abortion was redefined as a liberty interest rather 
than a fundamental right, and the Court adopted a balancing test to assess 
the constitutionality of abortion laws.172  States were allowed to regulate 
abortion throughout pregnancy as long as they did not impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.173  The Court offered the 
following definition: 
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.  A statute with 
this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further 
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice, not hinder it.  And a statute which, while furthering the interest in 
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered 
a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.174 
The Court determined that the state had a profound interest in protecting 
potential life throughout a woman’s pregnancy, and not merely after 
viability.175  The Court reasoned that, although a woman has a right to 
terminate her pregnancy prior to viability, the government was free to take 
steps to ensure that the choice was “thoughtful and informed.”176  The state, 
for example, was free to provide a woman with information about adoption 
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or welfare services that could help her provide for the child.177  As in the 
abortion funding cases, the Court reiterated the idea that the government 
may express a preference for childbirth over abortion by enacting laws 
pursuant to its interest in protecting the life of the unborn.178 
But the Supreme Court explicitly rejected one potentially legitimate 
interest—a state interest in condemning abortion as morally wrong.179  It 
pointed out that, although some of the Justices might personally find 
abortion morally repugnant, the Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty 
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”180  The Court acknowledged 
that although the government can typically adopt a position on an issue, it 
cannot do so where the choice involves a constitutionally protected 
liberty.181 
The Court also highlighted several types of regulations that would not 
constitute an undue burden, such as “law[s] which serve[] a valid purpose, 
one not designed to strike at the right itself, [or those that have] the 
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an 
abortion.”182  Furthermore, the government could enact regulations which 
were no more than a “structural mechanism” to express respect for the life 
of the unborn, so long as they were not substantial obstacles in the woman’s 
path.183  States are also free to enact laws designed to foster the health of a 
woman, if such laws are not an undue burden on her right to choose an 
abortion.184  Finally, “a state measure designed to persuade [a woman] to 
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that 
goal,” as long as it does not constitute an undue burden on her right to 
choose.185 
The Court’s application of the undue burden standard in Casey, however, 
is not entirely consistent, as demonstrated through its examinations of two 
of the provisions within the opinion:  the twenty-four hour waiting period 
and the spousal notification provision.186  Although an undue burden is 
defined by the purpose or effect of a law,187 the Court did not inquire too 
deeply into the “purpose” portion of the test when examining the restriction 
requiring a woman to wait twenty-four hours between her initial 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 872–73. 
 179. See id. at 850. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 850–51. 
 182. Id. at 874. 
 183. Id. at 877. 
 184. Id. at 878. 
 185. Id. 
 186. The undue burden test as set out in Casey is generally acknowledged to be unclear. 
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 829–30 (describing the undue burden test as “confusing 
to apply” and “ambigu[ous]”); Wharton et al., supra note 169, at 332–33 (“[D]educing the 
meaning of the undue burden standard from the joint opinion’s application of it to the 
Pennsylvania law is . . . difficult.”). 
 187. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
2012] SEEKING LIBERTY’S REFUGE 383 
consultation with her physician and the abortion procedure.188  The Court 
itself articulated Pennsylvania’s purpose as seeking to encourage reflective 
decision-making on the part of the woman, and a goal to protect the life of 
the unborn.189  The Court stated:  “The idea that important decisions will be 
more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does 
not strike us as unreasonable . . . .  In theory, at least, the waiting period is a 
reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting the life of 
the unborn.”190  The Court did not investigate whether this was in fact 
Pennsylvania’s purpose in passing the law, or whether there was any 
evidence that women made more thoughtful decisions after twenty-four 
hours.191 
The Court used an equally cursory approach to evaluate the effect prong 
of the test.  Although the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the 
increased cost of making two trips to an abortion clinic, instead of one, 
would be “particularly burdensome”192 to poor women, the Court did not 
find that this constituted an impermissible effect.193  The Court dismissed 
the idea that, for impoverished women, making two trips to an abortion 
clinic might very well constitute an undue burden on their financial ability 
to seek an abortion.194  The Court appears to have relied on the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania’s the choice of words, rather than the substance of 
its findings, in making its decision that “[a] particular burden is not of 
necessity a substantial obstacle.”195 
Conversely, the Court did strike down the spousal notification provision, 
which required that a married woman inform her husband prior to obtaining 
an abortion.196  Without explicitly mentioning purpose, the Court here 
recognized that the statute was enacted to further the illegitimate state 
interest of subordinating the wife’s interests to that of the husband’s—
relying on old-fashioned stereotypes about women.197 
Interestingly, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens had argued that the 
twenty-four hour waiting period either served only the illegitimate purpose 
of making abortions more difficult, or was otherwise unconstitutional 
because it was based upon outmoded stereotypes about a woman’s ability to 
make a rational decision on her own.198  Justice Stevens pointed to the 
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complete lack of evidence that the delay benefitted women or that it aided 
the doctor in conveying information to the patient, instead comparing it to 
the parental notification requirements for minor women seeking 
abortions.199  While there was evidence that teenagers needed help making 
a rational choice regarding abortion, none of this reasoning applied to adult 
women.200  He concluded: 
The mandatory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded and unacceptable 
assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of women. . . .  Just as we 
have left behind the belief that a woman must consult her husband before 
undertaking serious matters, so we must reject the notion that a woman is 
less capable of deciding matters of gravity.201 
Although the Court did not acknowledge Justice Stevens’s argument in 
its analysis of the twenty-four hour waiting period, the Court found this 
argument persuasive in the context of the spousal notification provision.202  
It noted that a man has a significant interest in the child his wife is carrying, 
yet rejected the state interest in protecting the husband as insufficiently 
weighty to justify limiting the wife’s right to obtain an abortion, given the 
“inescapable biological fact that state regulation . . . will have a far greater 
impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s.”203  The Court reasoned 
that a spousal notification requirement was repugnant to a modern 
conception of a woman’s autonomy in marriage:  “The husband’s interest in 
the life of the child his wife is carrying does not permit the State to 
empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his wife. . . .  
Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they 
marry.”204 
Furthermore, the requirement also had an unconstitutional effect.205  The 
Court found that the provision constituted a substantial obstacle to abortion 
access for women in abusive relationships.206  The Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania made substantial findings that women in such relationships 
will often face psychological or physical abuse from their husbands upon 
informing them of their choice to obtain an abortion, and have an increased 
risk of unplanned pregnancy as the result of spousal rape or coerced sexual 
activity.207  The Court held that this provision would deter these women 
from seeking abortions, and therefore have the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of these women.208 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 202. See id. at 895–98. 
 203. Id. at 896 (plurality opinion).  The Court further stated that because the state 
regulation implicated a woman’s “bodily integrity” as well as “the private sphere of the 
family,” it was “doubly deserving of scrutiny.” Id. 
 204. Id. at 898. 
 205. Id. at 893–94. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at 888–92. 
 208. Id. at 889, 893–94. 
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In contrast to the consideration given to the potential burden the twenty-
four hour waiting period imposed on some subset of impoverished women, 
the Court asserted that the spousal notification provision had to be struck 
down even though it only affected one percent of women seeking abortions 
in Pennsylvania.209  The Court stated:  “The analysis does not end with the 
one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. . . .  
The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is 
a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”210 
Therefore, even in Casey itself, the undue burden test is somewhat 
unclear,211 especially as to the purpose prong.212  Although Casey outlines a 
disjunctive test analyzing the “purpose or effect” of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, the Casey Court only 
seriously analyzes the effect of such laws, and this is how most other courts 
have applied the test.213 
4.  Purpose Analysis Post-Casey:  Mazurek v. Armstrong and 
Gonzales v. Carhart 
Since Casey, the Supreme Court examined purpose under the undue 
burden test in two cases.  In the first, Mazurek, the Court went so far as to 
suggest that an improper purpose without an improper effect is insufficient 
to strike down an abortion law.214  That case dealt with a Montana law that 
restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians.215  At the 
time, there was only one non-physician performing abortions in Montana, a 
physician’s assistant named Susan Cahill.216 
The District of Montana denied a preliminary injunction of the law, but 
the Ninth Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded for further fact-
finding and consideration of the law’s purpose.217  The Ninth Circuit found 
that the District of Montana had erroneously confined its purpose inquiry—
the district court refused to enjoin the law refused to enjoin the law because 
 
 209. Id. at 894. 
 210. Id. 
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 213. See Wharton et al., supra note 169, at 354 (“Most post–Casey legal challenges have 
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 214. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 
 215. Id. at 969. 
 216. Id. at 971. 
 217. See id. at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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it could not assume that none of the legislators was motivated by a 
legitimate purpose to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion.218 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s purpose 
inquiry.219  But because Casey did not provide a purpose-based test, the 
Ninth Circuit instead relied upon the Court’s articulation of the 
predominant factor test in two gerrymandering decisions, Miller and Shaw, 
to conduct a purpose inquiry.220  Based on this test, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the process which led to the law, as well as the structure of the 
legislation, were relevant in determining the purpose behind the law.221  
The Ninth Circuit concluded:  “A determination of purpose in the present 
case, then, may properly require an assessment of the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the enactment of [the physician-only law], and 
whether that statute in fact can be regarded as serving a legitimate health 
function.”222 
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision to remand, 
and called into question whether an invalid purpose alone can constitute a 
justification for declaring a law unconstitutional.223  The Court stated:  
“[E]ven assuming the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ implicit 
premise—that a legislative purpose to interfere with the constitutionally 
protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that right 
. . . could render the Montana law invalid—there is no basis for finding a 
vitiating legislative purpose here.”224  The Supreme Court cited to 
Washington to support the proposition that an unconstitutional purpose 
cannot be assumed, even when there is an unconstitutional effect.225  In 
Washington, it was determined that a facially neutral law was not 
unconstitutional merely because it had a discriminatory effect; rather, a 
separate showing of unconstitutional purpose was required to invalidate the 
law.226  Although the Court seemed to imply that both an unconstitutional 
purpose and effect are required to invalidate an abortion law, the Court 
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 224. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. 
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 226. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the basis that there was 
no evidence of invalid purpose here, rendering the above reasoning dicta.227 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court rejected two types of evidence 
of an improper purpose put forth by the respondents in Mazurek.228  First, 
the respondents argued that there must be an unlawful purpose because 
there was no medical reason supporting the physician-only restriction.229  
The Supreme Court rejected this argument based on the statement in Casey 
that states have “broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be 
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment 
might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others.”230  
Second, the respondents asserted that an anti-abortion group drafted the 
Montana law at issue, suggesting that the purpose of the law was to limit 
abortions.231  The Court rejected this argument with no analysis, simply 
stating that this said nothing about the legislature’s purpose in passing the 
law.232 
A three-Justice dissent penned by Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with 
the majority’s analysis of the merits, because the procedural posture of the 
case suggested that it should have been remanded for further fact-
finding.233  Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that the existing record 
contained substantial evidence that the Montana legislature was motivated 
by an improper purpose.234  He reasoned that the law was likely directed at 
preventing Cahill specifically from performing abortions, as she was 
mentioned by name in the legislative record.235  Justice Stevens also 
pointed to the language in Casey that a law is invalid if it “serve[s] no 
purpose other than to make abortions more difficult.”236  He concluded that 
the statute must therefore serve an improper purpose, because no health 
benefit to women could be shown.237 
Justice Stevens’s dissent also suggested that the majority should provide 
“enlightenment” as to whether the Ninth Circuit misapplied the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Miller and Shaw.238  In a footnote, the majority in 
Mazurek skirted the issue of the Ninth Circuit’s reading of those cases, 
saying it need not be addressed since the record did not reflect that the 
legislature’s predominant motive was to prevent abortions.239  But the 
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Ninth Circuit did not definitively say whether this had been the 
predominant motive; rather, it remanded for further fact-finding on this 
question.240  Therefore, it remains an open question whether the Supreme 
Court would find the Ninth Circuit’s approach to evaluating purpose valid 
in the event of a different factual record. 
Since Mazurek, the most significant Supreme Court decision dealing with 
legislative purpose in the abortion context is Gonzales, which is important 
because it is the Supreme Court’s most recent articulation of the undue 
burden test.241  In Gonzales, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003242 (Act).243  The Act banned a 
particular form of abortion known as intact dilation and extraction, which is 
performed late in pregnancy.244  This procedure involves partially 
delivering the fetus before completing the abortion.245  The Act banned the 
procedure except when necessary to save the life of the woman, but did not 
include an exception to protect the woman’s health.246 
The vast majority of abortions—eighty-five to ninety percent—are 
performed using other procedures in the first trimester, and these were not 
affected by the Act.247  The Act also left in place alternative methods of 
late-term abortion.248  For instance, the Act permitted non-intact dilation 
and evacuation, a procedure in which the doctor would partially dilate a 
woman’s cervix to the extent necessary to insert surgical tools into the 
uterus.249 
The Act was challenged for its lack of a health exception, because there 
was evidence that the alternative of non-intact dilation and evacuation 
presented increased health risks.250  It was also asserted that intact dilation 
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and extraction was safer for women with certain medical conditions or fetal 
anomalies.251  The lack of a health exception was legally significant,252 as 
the Court had struck down a similar Nebraska law for its failure to have a 
health exception a few years earlier in Stenberg v. Carhart.253  
Nevertheless, the Court found that legislatures could still act to ban the 
procedure in the face of “medical uncertainty,” in direct contrast to its 
findings in Stenberg.254 
Although the Act was not challenged on the basis of having an improper 
purpose,255 the Court nonetheless determined that Congress articulated a 
legitimate purpose for the law without doing a full purpose analysis.256  The 
Court found that Congress acted out of respect for the dignity of fetal life, 
which was identified as a legitimate state interest in Casey.257  According to 
the Court, the Act furthered this state interest by preventing intact dilation 
and extraction, because the procedure had a “disturbing similarity to the 
killing of a newborn infant.”258  The Court stated: 
Where it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue 
burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures 
and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in 
regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, 
including life of the unborn.259 
Here, the Court suggested that the interest only needed to meet rational 
basis review, without fully analyzing the law.260 
Without factual findings to support this point, the Court also found that 
the Act could be justified by a secondary interest in helping women make 
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an informed decision.261  The Court concluded:  “While we find no reliable 
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once 
created and sustained.”262  The Court reasoned that doctors often do not tell 
women the exact details of the intact dilation and extraction procedure, and 
that a woman who regrets having an abortion after the fact “must struggle 
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only 
after the event, what she once did not know:  that she allowed a doctor to 
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a 
child assuming the human form.”263  Therefore, the Court recognized two 
legitimate state interests for the Act without specifically analyzing how the 
statute is rationally related to those ends, or explicitly identifying a level of 
scrutiny. 
In a four-Justice dissent, Justice Ginsburg observed that even if these 
interests were legitimate, they were not rationally related to the Act’s 
prohibition of intact dilation and extraction.264  While the Act proscribed 
this procedure, as stated earlier, it allowed non-intact dilation and 
evacuation, a method of abortion that involves dismembering a fetus in the 
uterus and then evacuating it in pieces.265  Justice Ginsburg emphasized that 
the Act did not further the state’s interest in promoting respect for fetal life, 
as it not only failed to protect any fetus from being aborted, but also 
permitted this equally “brutal” abortion procedure.266 
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg stated that the interest in helping women 
make informed choices about abortion was not rationally related to the 
outright ban on intact dilation and extraction procedures.267  Instead of 
having doctors simply “inform women, accurately and adequately, of the 
different procedures and their attendant risks. . . .  [T]he Court deprives 
women of the right to make an autonomous choice.”268  Justice Ginsburg 
noted that such a justification for the law was impermissibly based upon 
“ancient notions about women’s place in the family . . . that have long since 
been discredited,” such as the need to pass laws to protect women based on 
their perceived timidity, weakness, and dependence on men.269  Justice 
Ginsburg also highlighted the uncertainty regarding how compelling the 
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state interest must be in order to limit a woman’s liberty interest in 
obtaining an abortion:  “Instead of the heightened scrutiny we have 
previously applied, the Court determines that a ‘rational’ ground is enough 
to uphold the Act.”270  Regardless of these disconnects with Casey, a five-
to-four majority upheld the Act.271 
II.  THE MANY FACES OF PURPOSE:  CONFLICTING VIEWS OF 
THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
The differing evaluations of legislative purpose under the undue burden 
test established in Casey, and referenced in Mazurek and Gonzales, have led 
to inconsistent applications of the purpose prong in the lower courts.  Some 
courts read Casey as creating per se rules regarding which types of abortion 
laws are constitutional, rather than applying the undue burden test to the 
particular set of facts before them.272  However, Casey leaves two 
important questions up for debate.  First, what is the standard for evaluating 
legislative purpose in the abortion context?  Casey states that abortion laws 
are invalid if they “serve no purpose other than to make abortions more 
difficult,” yet it provides no test for evaluating purpose.273  Furthermore, 
Mazurek rejected certain types of evidence used to show legislative 
purpose, without explicitly repudiating the “predominant factor” test used 
by the Ninth Circuit.274  Therefore, it is still unclear what the proper test is. 
Second, there is the question of what level of scrutiny courts should 
apply to legislative purpose in the context of abortion laws.  Although 
Gonzales contains language suggesting that the purpose need only be a 
“legitimate” one that is “rationally related” to the law’s means,275 Casey 
suggests that a higher form of scrutiny is required by rejecting ostensibly 
legitimate state interests—such as moral interests—as insufficient to justify 
limiting the abortion right.276  Furthermore, the “legitimate” interest 
identified in Gonzales—protecting human life—was identified in Casey as 
a “substantial” state interest,277 again suggesting that higher scrutiny is 
applied.  Therefore, there is uncertainty as to how important the legislative 
interest must be in order to justify impinging a woman’s abortion rights, 
and how closely the law must be tailored to meet that end. 
As a result of this uncertainty, various circuits have adopted different 
analyses of the purpose prong.  The Tenth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have 
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struck down laws based on impermissible purpose,278 though only the 
Eighth Circuit has done so on the basis of purpose alone, with no finding of 
an unconstitutional effect.279  These circuits apply a more searching review 
of the stated legislative purpose, and apply heightened scrutiny to the 
laws.280  Relying upon the Mazurek dicta, the Seventh and Fourth Circuits 
have taken a different approach to evaluating legislative purpose, and have 
invalidated laws on the basis of improper purpose only if they fail rational 
basis review (i.e., the law is not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest).281  Therefore, there is a conflict among the circuits 
regarding how to evaluate legislative purpose and how significant that 
purpose must be to uphold the abortion law in question.  This section will 
analyze the various approaches these courts have taken. 
A.  The Tenth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits: Applying Heightened Scrutiny to 
Legislative Purpose Under Casey 
The Tenth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have each applied a slightly 
different form of heightened scrutiny to legislative purpose.  The Tenth 
Circuit relied upon gerrymandering cases to evaluate legislative purpose, 
and found no legitimate purpose for the law in question.282  The Fifth 
Circuit investigated legislative purpose using both the Establishment Clause 
test from Edwards and the indicia of the predominant factor test, and struck 
down the challenged law under heightened scrutiny.283  Similarly, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s use of independent factual findings 
regarding legislative purpose, and also struck down the challenged law 
under heightened scrutiny.284 
1.  The Tenth Circuit Approach:  Adoption of the 
“Predominant Factor” Test 
 The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jane L. v. Bangerter was the first to 
strike down a statute under a purpose prong analysis.285  Jane L. dealt with 
a Utah statute defining viability at twenty weeks, and forbidding non-
therapeutic abortions after that point.286  The Jane L. court cited to Casey, 
Miller, Shaw, and the Ninth Circuit in Mazurek287 when it adopted the 
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predominant factor test, again looking at the structure of the legislation and 
the process of its enactment to determine whether the government was 
predominantly motivated by an impermissible purpose.288 
The Tenth Circuit found that the evidentiary record in Jane L. clearly 
reflected that Utah’s legislature acted with an improper predominant 
purpose.289  The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah legislature had 
deliberately ignored the clear statement in Roe and subsequent Supreme 
Court cases stating that viability was a matter for the woman’s physician to 
determine, not the legislature.290  The court also found that the legislature 
acted with an impermissible purpose because it established an abortion 
litigation trust to finance a challenge to Roe through litigating this 
statute.291  Moreover, Utah conceded in its briefs that it felt that women 
who waited more than twenty weeks to obtain an abortion had simply 
waited too long.292  Therefore, the court concluded that the law in question 
had been adopted predominantly for the impermissible purpose of 
preventing abortions.293  Because the court was unable to find a legitimate 
purpose for the law, the statute clearly failed rational basis review, and 
therefore, Tenth Circuit did not need to articulate a specific level of 
scrutiny.294 
Although the court highlighted impermissible purpose as an independent 
basis for invalidating the statute, the Tenth Circuit also found that the 
statute had the impermissible effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking to abort non-viable fetuses after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy, by forcing them to travel to other states for the procedure.295 
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In the more recent case of American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and 
Western Missouri v. Praeger,296 the District of Kansas (located in the Tenth 
Circuit) reviewed a motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement 
of a Kansas statute that prohibited insurance companies in Kansas from 
providing coverage under comprehensive health insurance policies for 
abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother.297 
Judge Brown, notably one of the three judges who decided Jane L., 
interpreted the Supreme Court in Mazurek as having confirmed that “a law 
is not invalid for an improper purpose unless the record supports a 
conclusion that the legislature’s ‘predominant motive’ was to create a 
substantial obstacle to abortion.”298  Judge Brown concluded that the 
plaintiffs had not met their burden in proving that the Kansas legislature’s 
predominant motive in passing this legislation was to create a substantial 
obstacle to abortion, as Kansas contended that the law furthered the state 
interest in lowering insurance costs.299  Furthermore, the state relied by 
analogy on the abortion funding cases, arguing that this law was a “freedom 
of conscience provision” that prevents those who object to abortion from 
having their money fund abortions, as “the pooling of premiums and risk 
pools makes insurance comparable to [the taxpayer money in the abortion 
funding] cases.”300  Because Kansas presented other motives for passing the 
legislation, Judge Brown concluded that the legislature’s predominant 
purpose in passing the law was not an unconstitutional one.301 
Judge Brown seemed to apply only rational basis review to the law,302 
and in doing so, conflated the two inquiries of (1) whether there was a 
legitimate state interest and (2) whether the law was rationally related to 
that interest:  as long as Kansas offered some legitimate purpose for the 
law, the law must stand.303  The opinion provides little analysis of whether 
such legitimate purposes are sufficiently weighty to justify infringing on the 
abortion right.304  Judge Brown relied on the state’s analogy to the abortion 
funding decisions to determine that the state interests were legitimate, 
simply stating that “[a]lthough defendant cites no authority upholding such 
a view, neither has this particular argument been directly tested or 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court.”305 
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2.  The Fifth Circuit Approach:  Examining Indicia of Legislative Purpose 
In Okpalobi v. Foster,306 the Fifth Circuit used the purpose prong to 
strike down a Louisiana statute that made abortion providers liable in tort 
for any damage done to a woman or her unborn child as a result of the 
abortion, thereby altering ordinary medical malpractice laws in the abortion 
context.307 
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that although the judiciary should 
typically grant significant deference to a legislature’s stated purpose, courts 
are not required to accept the government’s purpose at face value if it is a 
mere “sham.”308  The Okpalobi court relied upon the indicia used in the 
gerrymandering and Establishment Clause cases to determine how the 
Supreme Court conducts purpose inquiries, although it did not demand a 
showing of “predominant motive.”309  In assessing whether a legislative 
purpose was a “sham,” the Supreme Court looked at factors such as “the 
language of the challenged act, its legislative history, the social and 
historical context of the legislation, or other legislation concerning the same 
subject matter as the challenged measure.”310 
The Fifth Circuit deemed this approach to be consistent with Mazurek 
and Jane L.311  The Okpalobi Court read Mazurek to suggest that two types 
of evidence were insufficient to demonstrate improper purpose:  the lack of 
medical evidence and the involvement of anti-abortion groups in drafting 
the law.312  It also relied upon the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jane L., 
reading it to stand for the proposition that if a legislature admits to improper 
purpose, then the regulation will obviously fail the undue burden test.313  
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit interpreted both cases as confirming that 
“indicia of improper legislative purpose, such as statutory language, 
legislative history and context, and related legislation,” are relevant to the 
purpose prong of the undue burden test.314 
The state asserted that the law’s purpose was to encourage a doctor to 
inform a woman of all the risks associated with having an abortion.315  The 
Fifth Circuit found that there was already existing legislation that dealt with 
informed consent in the abortion context.316  The pre-existing statute 
allowed a physician to escape civil liability if he or she had fully complied 
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with the law.317  Therefore, the court found that the legislature’s stated 
purpose for the new law was likely a “sham,” since Louisiana already had 
laws addressing the interest.318 
Furthermore, without explicitly identifying a level of scrutiny, the Fifth 
Circuit appeared to apply heightened scrutiny to the law when it found that 
the means employed by the statute were not substantially related to the 
stated purpose.  Again, the stated purpose was to encourage physicians to 
inform women of all the risks associated with having an abortion.319  But 
the statute provided a cause of action to a woman for any “injuries suffered 
or damages occasioned by the unborn child or mother.”320  The signing of 
an informed consent provision by the woman prior to the abortion 
procedure did not negate the cause of action, but rather only lessened the 
amount of damages that the woman could recover.321  Therefore, the 
Okpalobi court found that the means employed by the statute were not 
substantially related to the purpose of promoting informed consent, since 
doctors were still liable even if they fully informed their patients.322 
Although the court struck down the law under the purpose prong,323 it 
also found that there was significant evidence that the law would drive 
abortion providers out of the state by prohibitively increasing their civil 
liability.324  Therefore, like the Tenth Circuit in Jane L., the Fifth Circuit 
suggests that purpose alone is enough to declare the regulation 
unconstitutional, but in practice strikes down the challenged law using both 
the purpose and effect prongs.325 
3.  The Eighth Circuit Approach:  Advocating Independent Judicial 
Findings Regarding Legislative Purpose 
Of the circuit courts, only the Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood of 
Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison326 has struck down a government decision on 
the basis of improper purpose alone, without a concurrent finding of 
unconstitutional effect.327  In 1977, Iowa enacted a generally applicable 
“certificate of need” (CON) law that regulates the development of new or 
changed institutional health services.328  The law requires that healthcare 
providers apply to the Iowa Department of Health for a CON before 
commencing a new development project.329  The decision to grant a CON is 
made by the Health Facilities Counsel, whose members are chosen by the 
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governor.330  The CON law exempts physician-owned clinics from its 
reach, and over the years, as the types of health care providers changed, this 
was typically construed to include physician-controlled clinics as well.331  
The government sought to compel a new Planned Parenthood clinic to 
undergo CON review, even though this type of clinic would typically fall 
under the exemption.332  The Atchison court found that while CON laws 
themselves are entirely permissible, the state subjected Planned Parenthood 
to CON review solely for the purpose of impeding access to abortions for 
Iowa women.333 
In evaluating the governmental purpose behind the law, the Eighth 
Circuit reviewed the Southern District of Iowa’s findings and, without 
articulating an exact test for determining legislative purpose, found that the 
Southern District of Iowa properly investigated the decision to subject 
Planned Parenthood to CON review: 
 There is no question but that the groups opposed to abortion have a 
perfect right to lobby in favor of subjecting [Planned Parenthood]’s 
proposed new facility to CON review.  Our concern, however, chiefly lies 
in the state authorities’ response to these lobbying efforts . . . .  The 
plaintiff introduced evidence of specific clinics across Iowa that were 
structured similarly to its proposed project and which were exempted 
from CON review.  The plaintiff also introduced evidence of specific 
family planning clinics across Iowa which were structured similarly to its 
proposed project, and which provided essentially the same services, but 
not abortions, and which were exempted from CON review.  Moreover, 
Department officials could not explain the Department’s deviation from 
its past practice of exempting similar clinics which did not offer 
pregnancy termination services to including the plaintiff’s clinic which 
would offer such services.334 
The Eighth Circuit did not show deference to the government’s 
conceivably legitimate decision that Planned Parenthood’s new clinic was 
reviewable because “it was a new ‘institutional health facility’ subject to 
CON reviewability insofar as it was an ‘organized outpatient facility.’”335  
Instead, the Southern District of Iowa made independent factual findings 
that the legislature impermissibly caved to community pressure in making 
the decision to subject the Planned Parenthood clinic to CON review.336 
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit held the legislature’s actions to 
heightened scrutiny.  The court observed:  “No one contends that Iowa’s 
CON laws serve no legitimate state interest, or that Iowa has no legitimate 
interest in enforcing its CON laws.”337  The opinion stated two such 
legitimate interests:  to prevent the establishment of unnecessary health care 
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facilities and to ensure the orderly development of new health care 
facilities.338  Although requiring the Planned Parenthood clinic to undergo 
CON review was rationally related to these interests, the Court found this 
insufficient.  Because it found that CON laws were not ordinarily applied to 
facilities like the Planned Parenthood clinic, the court held that the means 
were not substantially related to the state’s interest, since the CON review 
seemed like a discriminatory, one-time decision, rather than a general 
policy in furtherance of the law’s stated goals.339  The Eighth Circuit 
concluded by citing Casey:  “Where a requirement serves no purpose other 
than to make abortions more difficult, it strikes at the heart of a protected 
right, and is an unconstitutional burden on that right.”340  Therefore, the 
Eighth Circuit advocated heightened scrutiny of legislative purpose in the 
abortion context. 
B.  Deference to the Legislature:  The Fourth and Seventh Circuits Apply 
Rational Basis Review 
Although some circuits applied heightened scrutiny to legislative purpose 
in the context of abortion related laws, other circuits have been more 
deferential. In Karlin v. Foust,341 the Seventh Circuit interpreted the 
Mazurek dicta as vastly diminishing the power of the purpose prong, 
applying an extremely deferential form of review to the stated legislative 
purpose, and requiring that the purpose need only meet rational basis 
review.342  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Greenville Women’s Clinic v. 
Bryant343 rejected the approach used by the Eighth Circuit in Atchison, 
opting instead for a deferential review of the legislature’s stated purpose—
even in the face of lower court findings to the contrary—and subjecting the 
regulation to rational basis review.344 
1.  The Seventh Circuit Approach:  Purpose-Based Challenges Are 
Virtually Impossible After Mazurek 
In Karlin, the Seventh Circuit rejected a purpose prong challenge to a 
Wisconsin informed consent statute that required a face-to-face meeting 
between the physician and the woman twenty-four hours before the 
abortion procedure.345 
In seeking a standard by which to evaluate legislative purpose, the Karlin 
court relied upon Casey’s acceptance, at face value, of the state purpose for 
a twenty-four waiting period.346  The Seventh Circuit reasoned: 
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Casey would seem to indicate that the Court would not scrutinize too 
closely the stated purpose or purposes of a regulation given the state’s 
legitimate interest from the outset of a woman’s pregnancy in persuading 
women to choose childbirth over abortion as long as the regulation was 
reasonably designed to further that interest.347 
The Karlin court showed great deference to the legislative purposes asserted 
by the state, without doing any independent investigation into whether they 
were in fact true.348  The court stated:  “Absent some evidence 
demonstrating that the stated purpose is pretextual, our inquiry into the 
legislative purpose is necessarily deferential and limited.”349 
The court also read Mazurek to suggest that a state abortion regulation 
would survive an impermissible purpose challenge if it were reasonably 
designed to further the state’s legitimate interests in protecting the life of 
the fetus or the health of the mother.350  Based on its readings of Casey and 
Mazurek, the Seventh Circuit concluded that abortion regulations only 
needed to meet something similar to rational basis review under a purpose 
prong challenge.351  Because Wisconsin proffered several legitimate state 
interests for the regulation,352 the Karlin court found that the waiting period 
was rationally related to these interests and upheld the regulations against a 
purpose prong challenge.353 
Therefore, while the Seventh Circuit did not altogether foreclose the idea 
of a purpose prong challenge, it stated that “such a challenge will rarely be 
successful, absent some sort of explicit indication from the state that it was 
acting in furtherance of an improper purpose.”354  This places an extremely 
high burden on plaintiffs, as the state must effectively concede to an 
improper purpose for a purpose-based challenge to be successful in the 
Seventh Circuit.  
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2.  The Fourth Circuit Approach:  Deference to the Legislature Even in the 
Event of Judicial Findings to the Contrary 
Without providing much of an analytical framework, the Fourth Circuit 
adopted a similarly deferential test in Greenville Women’s Clinic v. 
Bryant.355  Bryant dealt with a South Carolina statute requiring most 
abortion facilities to be licensed by the state, and to meet various 
regulations regarding “sanitation, housekeeping, maintenance, staff 
qualifications, emergency equipment and procedures to provide emergency 
care, medical records and reports, laboratory, procedure and recovery 
rooms, physical plant, quality assurance, infection control, and information 
on and access to patient follow-up care necessary to carry out the purposes 
of this section.”356  A physician challenged these regulations, because the 
prohibitive cost of modifying his clinic would have forced him to close 
it.357 
Similar to the Southern District of Iowa’s approach in Atchison, the 
District of South Carolina made factual findings to determine that the new 
regulations served no legitimate state interest, since there was no evidence 
that they would improve health care within the state.358  The Fourth Circuit 
rejected the factual findings of the district court, deferring to the stated 
health-related purposes of the legislature even in the face of contrary 
findings by the lower court.359  Despite the district court’s findings 
regarding legislative purpose, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the ostensibly 
legitimate reason given by the South Carolina legislature of acting to 
safeguard women’s health.360 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit appeared to apply rational basis review 
to the regulations.  To justify their deferential level of review, the Fourth 
Circuit relied on the statement in Casey that “[i]f a regulation serves a valid 
purpose—‘one not designed to strike at the right itself’—the fact that it also 
has ‘the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to 
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.’”361  Although the 
district court’s findings indicated that these regulations were not 
substantially related to any actual benefit to women’s health, the Fourth 
Circuit ignored this lack of nexus, stating that “there is no requirement that 
a state refrain from regulating abortion facilities until a public-health 
problem manifests itself.”362  Because these clinic specifications were a 
“reasonable attempt to further the health of abortion patients in South 
Carolina,” the Fourth Circuit upheld them.363 
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III.  THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF THE PURPOSE PRONG 
In the absence of explicit guidance from Casey on how to conduct a 
purpose prong inquiry, lower courts have adopted an array of methods to 
analyze legislative purpose in the context of abortion laws.  Part III of this 
Note seeks to synthesize the methods of the various circuits, and to provide 
a practicable solution for courts to conduct purpose prong inquiries in the 
future. 
As a threshold matter, it appears clear that Mazurek did not wholly 
foreclose purpose prong challenges.  Although the Court in Gonzales did 
not directly face a purpose prong challenge, the vigorous debate over the 
legitimacy of the legislative purposes suggests that the Justices are still 
considering this issue.364  That four justices were willing to strike down an 
abortion law in Gonzales for having an improper purpose indicates that 
Mazurek did not eviscerate Casey’s purpose prong.365  This reading is 
logical given that in every other area of law—constitutional or otherwise—a 
law that serves an unconstitutional interest can be struck down.366  
Therefore, it is illogical to assume that litigants cannot bring purpose-based 
challenges in the abortion context. 
Acknowledging that purpose prong challenges remain viable, courts must 
next struggle with the first question addressed by this Note:  How searching 
should their review of legislative purpose be?  It is not always easy to tell 
what the legislature’s purpose was in enacting a law.367  Although 
sometimes an unguarded legislature will concede to an unconstitutional 
purpose (as in Jane L.),368 purpose prong challenges should not be limited 
to cases where an unconstitutional purpose is flaunted before the court.  
Although the Seventh and Fourth Circuits advocate a deferential approach 
to evaluating legislative purpose,369 courts need not be blind to the fact that 
many of these laws are proposed and supported by anti-abortion activists in 
an attempt to narrow the abortion right.370  Furthermore, some legislators 
appear unwilling to respect current Supreme Court abortion precedent, as 
shown by their willingness to propose unconstitutional legislation such as 
the personhood bills or heartbeat bills.371  Therefore, in the context of 
abortion laws, such deference to the legislature is not warranted. 
This Note contends that the method adopted by the Fifth Circuit in 
Okpalobi is the most appropriate for evaluating the context of abortion 
laws.372  Okpalobi relies in part on the test used for Establishment Clause 
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challenges.373  Like laws that are challenged under the Establishment 
Clause, abortion laws are often motivated by moral or religious beliefs.374  
Courts should not be required to ignore this reality and defer to another 
stated purpose if that purpose is a mere “sham.”375  Furthermore, the 
Okpalobi test itself encompasses the underlying elements of the tests used 
by the Tenth and Eighth Circuits.376  The Okpalobi test divines a state’s 
predominate motive through the same indicia of legislative purpose test as 
was used by the Tenth Circuit in Jane L.:  the language of the challenged 
law, its legislative history, the social and historical context of the 
legislation, or other legislation concerning the same subject matter as the 
challenged measure.377  The Eighth Circuit in Atchison also examined these 
factors in conducting their purpose inquiry without explicitly laying out a 
test.378  Adopting the Okpalobi test will provide a useful, unambiguous 
framework for courts to use in evaluating the legislative purpose behind 
abortion laws. 
Although this standard will provide courts with a practical test to discern 
legislative purpose in the abortion context, it does not answer the more 
significant question raised by this Note.  While a law can be struck down if 
it does not further any legitimate purpose, there is still uncertainty as to the 
standard of review when the state offers some rational purpose for the 
law.379  The Fourth and Seventh Circuits assume that the law need only 
pass rational basis review:  the legislature must articulate a legitimate 
purpose, and the regulation must be rationally related to that purpose.380  
Conversely, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits require a form of heightened 
scrutiny:  the government must offer a more important interest than simply 
a legitimate one, and the regulation must be substantially related to that 
interest.381 
Consistent with the approaches taken by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,382 
this Note advocates that an abortion law must meet heightened scrutiny, 
requiring that a regulation be substantially related to an important 
government interest.383  The legislative action need not meet strict scrutiny, 
but not every legitimate state interest is sufficiently weighty to justify 
limiting the abortion right.384  Although Casey and Gonzales contain 
language that could suggest that abortion regulations must be supported by 
a mere “legitimate” state interest,385 the undue burden standard is not 
synonymous with rational basis review, but is instead a unique 
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constitutional standard.386  Casey intended to replace the rigid framework 
of Roe with a balancing test.387  By introducing the undue burden test, 
Casey acknowledged that the state’s interests in protecting the health of the 
mother and promoting respect for fetal life are important enough to justify 
some infringement on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion throughout her 
pregnancy,388 and not merely after certain points in her pregnancy as stated 
in Roe.389  But Casey also made clear that those rights are not absolute, and 
must be balanced against the woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an 
abortion if she so chooses.390  Instead of tipping the balance in favor of 
either the woman’s rights or the state’s interests, an intermediate level of 
scrutiny that balances both is appropriate. 
An analysis of the permissible state interests identified in the Casey 
opinion strongly supports the use of heightened scrutiny, as the plurality 
rejected several “legitimate” state interests sufficient to pass rational basis 
review.391  For example, Casey rejected a husband’s interest in the life of a 
fetus carried by his wife as insufficiently significant to justify infringing 
upon a woman’s right to an abortion, even though his interest is 
undoubtedly legitimate.392  Casey also explicitly stated that moral 
disapproval of abortion is insufficient to justify burdening a liberty interest, 
even though morality interests typically constitute legitimate state 
interests.393  Interestingly, even the Seventh Circuit, which does not apply 
heightened scrutiny, interpreted Casey as requiring something more than 
just any legitimate state interest, as the court in Karlin recognized that only 
the state’s interests in protecting the life of the fetus or the health of the 
mother are considered “legitimate” in the abortion context.394 
The application of heightened scrutiny to abortion laws is also supported 
by the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence outside of the 
abortion context.395  The Supreme Court has always required that a 
legislature offer more than simply a legitimate state interest to justify 
infringement of a constitutionally protected right.396  Therefore, it is a 
logical reading of Casey that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard 
of review for purpose prong inquiries. 
More clarity from the Supreme Court on what constitutes an “important” 
state interest in the context of abortion laws would be helpful.  
Nevertheless, Roe, Casey, and the abortion funding cases identify four 
frequently used state interests which are sufficiently important to validate 
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infringement of a woman’s liberty interest in obtaining an abortion:  (1) 
protecting a woman’s health; (2) promoting respect for fetal life; (3) 
informing a woman’s choice; and (4) encouraging childbirth.397  The lower 
courts have struggled with purpose in part because regulations that 
encourage childbirth and regulations that discourage abortion are two sides 
of the same coin—one side being permissible, and one side being 
impermissible.398  Thus, even acknowledging that heightened scrutiny 
applies, the question remains:  How can courts draw this fine distinction 
between permissible and impermissible state interests? 
This issue can be resolved simply by applying the second step of 
heightened scrutiny:  whether the regulation is substantially related to the 
valid purpose.399  If it does not in fact substantially further the stated 
purpose, it may be logically inferred that the stated purpose is a “sham,” 
and that the legislature adopted the regulation to advance the impermissible 
interest of hindering a woman’s right to an abortion.400  To provide clarity 
to the proposed standard, this Note demonstrates how various categories of 
abortion laws either are, or are not, substantially related to their purported 
purpose. 
Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion 
are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.401  While the Fourth 
Circuit in Bryant pointed out that legislatures need not wait for a public 
health crisis in order to regulate abortion,402 neither can a legislature justify 
arbitrary restrictions on doctors or clinics that are not substantially related 
to any actual benefit to women’s health.403  For example, regulations 
mandating the exact width of hallways and the type of elevators in an 
abortion clinic, although ostensibly related to regulating the medical 
profession, do not substantially advance an interest in making abortions 
safer for women.404  Such health-based regulations must be grounded in 
legitimate medical science in order to guarantee the substantial relationship 
between the legislative purpose and the regulation.405  Without empirical 
evidence showing that these regulations benefit women’s health, it may be 
inferred that such regulations were only passed to make it more onerous for 
physicians to provide abortions.406 
The other three constitutional interests of informing a woman’s choice, 
protecting fetal life, and promoting childbirth will be treated together.  
While informing a woman’s choice is a state interest in and of itself, it is 
also a means by which the state can promote respect for fetal life and 
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encourage childbirth.407  Providing a woman with truthful information 
about her pregnancy and the abortion procedure, as well as information 
about alternative options, such as adoption or the possibility of child 
support payments, advances these interests by informing a woman of other 
options besides abortion with which she may not be familiar.408  A woman 
might be convinced to choose childbirth after hearing about other available 
options or learning about the medical risks of abortion.409  Therefore, 
providing a woman with truthful information is substantially related to the 
goals of encouraging childbirth, promoting respect for fetal life, and 
ensuring that a woman makes an informed choice. 
Another common abortion law that is substantially related to encouraging 
a woman to choose childbirth is parental notification.410  Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that minors do not have the same rational decision-
making capabilities as adults, nor do they necessarily consider the 
consequences of their actions in the same way.411  Speaking to a parent 
before obtaining an abortion could encourage a young woman to think 
seriously about her options.  Furthermore, a parent would reasonably be 
able to provide the young woman with truthful information about what it is 
like to raise a child, as well as how much financial and emotional support 
she could expect from her parent by doing so.412  All of this will serve to 
inform her choice of what is the best option.  Therefore, such regulations 
are also substantially related to their purpose of informing a minor woman’s 
choice and encouraging her to choose childbirth. 
But several other laws promulgated under the ostensible interest of 
informing a woman’s choice and encouraging her to choose childbirth are 
not substantially related to this goal.  One such category of regulations 
includes laws requiring a waiting period between an initial visit to the 
physician and the abortion procedure.413  Although the legislative goal of 
informing a woman’s choice to obtain an abortion is itself fully valid, 
legislatures may not rely upon outdated paternalistic stereotypes about a 
woman’s decision-making capacities in determining which regulations 
serve to inform a woman’s choice.414  Requiring a fully-informed woman 
who is resolute in her decision to wait for an abortion assumes that she is 
incapable of making a thoughtful decision without state intervention.415  
Furthermore, if a woman feels that she needs time to weigh her options 
after speaking to her doctor, she is free to make that choice on her own.416  
 
 407. See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 410. Whether these regulations have the unconstitutional effect of imposing an undue 
burden on some subset of minors seeking abortions is outside the scope of this Note. 
 411. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 412. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra notes 198–201, 268–69 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra notes 201, 268–69 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
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By relying upon outmoded stereotypes instead of proven facts,417 the 
relationship between the purpose and the regulation is severed.  Rather, the 
law and its purpose can only be tied together by this wholly discredited line 
of logic, and such laws should be struck down as unconstitutional.418 
Another problematic category of laws is restrictions that prevent 
insurance companies from covering abortions under their generally 
applicable healthcare policies.419  Legislators proffer a variety of purposes 
for such laws, such as encouraging childbirth, decreasing insurance costs, 
and protecting those who morally oppose abortions from indirectly funding 
them.420 
Insurance bans do not further the purported purpose of encouraging 
childbirth.421  The Court in Casey stated that the government may 
encourage childbirth by ensuring that a woman’s choice to obtain an 
abortion was thoughtful and informed, and by enacting laws to promote 
respect for fetal life.422  An insurance law, by contrast, does not inform a 
woman’s choice with any new information, but instead simply increases the 
out-of-pocket cost for an abortion.423  Coercing a woman through financial 
pressure violates Casey’s mandate that abortion laws must serve to inform a 
woman’s free choice, not hinder it.424 
Similarly, the remaining purported interests of decreasing costs and 
protecting the rights of those morally opposed to abortion, while legitimate, 
are not important state interests.  Casey explicitly foreclosed the argument 
that a moral justification alone is important enough to limit the abortion 
right.425  Similarly, cutting insurance costs fails to rise to the level of an 
 
 417. In Gonzales, the Court explicitly admitted that it had no evidence that women come 
to regret their choices to get an abortion, or need state protection from their decisions. See 
supra note 261 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting that Justice Ginsburg, the only 
woman on the Court at the time Gonzales was decided, dissented. See supra note 264 and 
accompanying text. 
 418. This evaluation differs from the result in Casey, which upheld the twenty-four hour 
waiting period. See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.  But Casey did not delve 
deeply into the purpose behind the law; rather, the opinion focused upon the fact that the 
waiting period in that particular instance did not have an unconstitutional effect. See supra 
notes 187–91 and accompanying text.  Courts now often rubber-stamp waiting-period laws, 
instead of looking at the unique circumstances of each individual case, because one such 
provision was upheld in Casey. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.  This Note 
argues that this is an erroneous application of Casey, and that waiting periods are often 
motivated by an unconstitutional purpose to make abortions more difficult to obtain. See 
supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 419. See supra notes 7, 296–304 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra notes 19, 136, 157, 299–300, 305 and accompanying text. 
 421. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text. 
 422. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 423. See Spece, supra note 299, at 101 (“[Persuading women to forego abortions] is 
reasonably to be taken as a reference to genuine attempts to facilitate a woman’s decision-
making process and prevent future regret by providing information and time to assure that 
the woman’s choice is both informed and voluntary.  Otherwise, there would be virtually no 
limits to the nature and duration of persuasive practices.”). 
 424. See supra notes 174, 273 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
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important state interest.426  Courts must be careful not to elide the undue 
burden standard with rational basis review; the Casey Court rejected the 
idea that any legitimate purpose is sufficient to justify infringing upon the 
abortion right.427 
CONCLUSION 
This Note provides a meaningful framework for the lower courts 
properly apply the purpose prong of Casey.  For the reasons stated above, 
this Note advocates a searching review of legislative purpose using the 
principles established in Okpalobi, as well as the application of heightened 
scrutiny to abortion laws. 
While most consonant with Supreme Court fundamental rights 
jurisprudence as a whole, this approach also ensures that legislatures respect 
the boundaries of a woman’s right to liberty in making the decision of 
whether or not to bear a child.  This guarantees that the credibility and 
dignity of the Court in its role as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning 
remains intact, and safeguards a liberty interest which is considered 
fundamental by many women.  Though many Americans may find abortion 
morally repugnant, America was founded on the principles of individual 
liberty, which necessarily encompasses the freedom of choice. 
 
 426. See supra notes 59, 66–67, 74 and accompanying text. 
 427. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
